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Abstract 
This paper examines Aristotle’s theory of distributive justice and its meaning for 
his theory of constitutions. First, it shows that his account of constitutions in 
Books IV–VI of the Politics is an extension and refinement of his scheme of six 
constitutions in Book III. Second, it argues for the thesis that the account of 
justice (τὸ δίκαιον) in distribution of political offices that Aristotle gives in Book 
III of the Politics links up with and extends the doctrine of justice (δικαιοσύνη) 
that he develops in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics. Third, it substantiates the 
thesis that Aristotle understands the different forms of constitution as 
embodiments of different conceptions of distributive justice, and argues for the 
thesis that Aristotle has a clear preference for the aristocratic conception and, as a 
consequence, for aristocracy. Finally, it supports the thesis that the constitution of 
the best polis, which Aristotle outlines in Books VII and VIII of the Politics, has 
to be understood as a true aristocracy and not as a polity (πολιτεία). 
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The twentieth century has witnessed an impressive renaissance of 
Aristotle’s practical philosophy. This is not only true for his virtue ethics 
but for his political philosophy, which is mainly a theory of constitutions1. 
                                                 
*  For their astute and helpful comments on this paper I thank Elena Irrera and Bruno 
Langmeier. For considerable improvements in language and style I thank Jeremy Bell 
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The ethical virtue that is most important for Aristotle’s political 
philosophy is justice. In his theory of justice, he distinguishes different 
forms of justice, which should be applied in different spheres of the city 
(πόλις)2. In the tradition of Aristotle, today we associate justice with the 
laws of a political community, with a fair exchange of private goods, with 
lawful punishment or a just distribution of public goods. Most significant 
for Aristotle’s political philosophy are his conceptions of universal justice, 
which requires citizens to abide by the laws of the polis, and distributive 
justice, a part of particular justice. Though not usually recognized in the 
literature, distributive justice already plays a central role in the political 
philosophy which Plato develops in the Politeia and the Nomoi (cf. Knoll 
2010). In contemporary political philosophy, distributive justice is still a 
much-debated concept: not only John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, but 
the theory that Michael Walzer develops in Spheres of Justice, revolve 
around the question of a just distribution of social goods (Rawls 1971, 
Walzer 1983).       
This paper examines Aristotle’s theory of distributive justice and its 
meaning for his theory of constitutions3. Such an investigation has to face 
some well-known philological problems and questions: does Aristotle 
have a coherent theory of constitutions or did his teaching develop over his 
lifetime, as Werner Jaeger suggested in his renowned book first published 
                                                                                                                            
and Stephen Snyder. And finally, thanks to David Butorac for checking my translations 
from Greek into English.  
1  For a detailed account of this renaissance and especially of the renaissance of Aristotle’s 
political philosophy see the voluminous dissertation GUTSCHKER 2002. 
2  Aristotle develops his theory of justice in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, which 
contains the identical text as Book IV of the Eudemian Ethics, and in his Politics 
(especially in Book III).  
3  For a fundamental critique of the legitimacy to use the term “distributive justice” for 
Aristotle’s account of the distribution of political power see SCHÜTRUMPF 2017. For my 
arguments against this critique see KNOLL 2011b. 
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in 1923 (Jaeger 1955)?4 Is Aristotle’s account of constitutions in Books 
IV–VI of the Politics an extension and refinement of his well-known 
scheme of six constitutions in Book III or does it represent a new 
theoretical approach?5 And on the most general level: Should we regard 
Aristotle’s Politics as a unified work with a coherent theory or do we have 
to understand it as a composition of an earlier and a later treatise or as a 
collection of political essays that were written in different periods of his 
life?6 
This paper is not only based on but defends the weak Unitarian thesis, 
according to which the eight books of the Politics develop a coherent and 
unified theory of constitutions7. The first section gives a brief introduction 
to Aristotle’s theory of constitutions and shows that his account of 
constitutions in Books IV–VI of the Politics is an extension and 
refinement of his scheme of six constitutions in Book III. Section two 
elucidates Aristotle’s theory of distributive justice and the political dispute 
about how to fill its two formal principles with content and make them 
concrete. It shows that for the political culture of his time Aristotle 
distinguishes between four different conceptions of distributive justice. 
                                                 
4  For a contemporary assessment of Jaeger’s hypothesis and an informative account of the 
history of its perception see BERTELLI 2016.  
5  This is one of the central issues of my disagreement with Eckart Schütrumpf. According 
to Schütrumpf’s genetic view, in Books IV–VI Aristotle takes a new theoretical approach 
in his constitutional theory. Against this view I argue that Aristotle’s account of 
constitutions in Books IV–VI of the Politics is an expansion and refinement of his 
scheme of six constitutions (KNOLL 2011 b, 417–421; cf. fn. 12). 
6  For an overview of the controversy between a genetic-analytic and a Unitarian view of 
the Politics see SCHÜTRUMPF 1980, 287–326, ROWE 1991, and BERTELLI 2016.   
7  According to the strong Unitarian thesis, the eight books of the Politics should be viewed 
as a coherent and unified work. Though many reasons and arguments for a strong 
Unitarian thesis can be given, our sources do not allow us to provide final and 
incontestable evidence for it. For my arguments for both versions of the Unitarian thesis 
see KNOLL 2009, 2011a, 2011b.    
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The section argues for the thesis that the account of justice (τὸ δίκαιον) in 
distribution of political offices which Aristotle gives in Book III of the 
Politics links up with and extends the doctrine of justice (δικαιοσύνη) that 
he develops in the Nicomachean Ethics. The third section substantiates 
the thesis that Aristotle understands the different forms of constitution as 
embodiments of different conceptions of distributive justice. Furthermore, 
it argues for the thesis that Aristotle has a clear preference for the 
aristocratic conception and, as a consequence, for aristocracy. The section 
devotes special attention to Aristotle’s argumentation for the aristocratic 
conception of distributive justice. The final section, which is presented as 
a conclusion, supports the thesis that the constitution of the best polis, 
which Aristotle outlines in Books VII and VIII of the Politics, has to be 
understood as a true aristocracy and not as a polity (πολιτεία).       
In the literature, the question of Aristotle’s political preferences is a 
controversial issue. His well-known scheme of six constitutions provides 
no criterion to solve the problem of which of the three correct 
constitutions Aristotle prefers. In kingship, aristocracy and polity alike, 
the rulers govern for the common good (τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον) and not for 
their personal advantage. In his outline of the constitution of the best polis 
in Books VII and VIII, Aristotle doesn’t give this constitution a name. 
These are two important reasons why, to this day, there is a controversy 
regarding Aristotle’s fundamental political convictions. The first line of 
interpretation, which prevails in the English speaking world, claims that 
the constitution of the best polis is an aristocracy of the best men (Barker 
1959, 353; Keyt 1991; Mulgan 1991, 318; Depew 1991, 346, 362; 
Chuska 2000; Bates 2003, 97). The second line, which is still dominant 
among German scholars, understands Aristotle’s “ideal constitution” as a 
mixed government, which he calls polity (πολιτεία) (Bien 1980, 315ff.; 
Ottmann 2001, 210; Sternberger 1984, 119, 127, 156). As a defender of 
“Aristotelian Social Democracy”, Martha Nussbaum belongs in this line 
as well (1990; 2000, 109; 2001, 147). 
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1. Aristotle’s theory of constitutions 
Aristotle lays out his theory of constitutions, the central subject of the 
Politics, in Books II through VII. Of course, for a political thinker rooted 
in the ancient world of the polis the term “constitution” (πολιτεία) has a 
different meaning than for us today. In Book III Aristotle presents his 
well-known scheme of six constitutions and gives a first version of his 
definition of a constitution:  
 
A constitution is the order of a polis in respect to its various offices, and 
especially in respect to that office which is supreme in all issues. The supreme 
office is everywhere the government of the polis, in fact the government is the 
constitution itself (ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ 
μάλιστα τῆς κυρίας πάντων. κύριον μὲν γὰρ πανταχοῦ τὸ πολίτευμα τῆς πόλεως, 
πολίτευμα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία, Pol. III 6, 1278b 8-11)8.  
 
Aristotle understands a constitution as the order (τάξις) which 
determines who rules in the political community. He even identifies the 
constitution with the group of the ruling citizens. According to the literal 
meanings of the names of the constitutions, Aristotle defines a democracy 
as the rule of the people (δῆμος), and an oligarchy as the rule of the few 
(ὀλίγοι) (Pol. III 6, 1278 b 11–13). In the following paragraphs, Aristotle 
differentiates also the other forms of constitution according to the criterion 
of who rules in the polis. In doing so, he introduces his scheme of six 
constitutions, which separates the three good constitutions kingship, 
aristocracy, and polity (πολιτεία), from their perversions, tyranny, 
oligarchy, and democracy. 
Essentially, Aristotle’s constitutional scheme goes back to Plato, who 
develops it in the Politikos. In this dialogue, Plato’s protagonist, a 
                                                 
8  All Greek quotes of the Politics are taken from the edition of W. D. Ross (ARISTOTELIS, 
1957). 
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stranger from Elea, already divides constitutions into three right and three 
wrong ones. The basis of both divisions is the quantitative distinction of 
whether one, a few, or the many rule. Like Aristotle, Plato comprehends 
kingship as the good government of one ruler and tyranny as the bad. 
Similar to his student, Plato understands aristocracy as the good 
government of a few rulers and oligarchy as the bad. While Aristotle calls 
the legitimate rule of the many “polity” (πολιτεία), and the illegitimate 
one “democracy”, Plato uses the term “democracy” for both (Pol. III 7, 
1279 a 32–1279 b 10; Politikos, 302 c/d). There are two further 
differences between the two constitutional schemes. First, contrary to 
Aristotle, Plato assumes a paradigmatic seventh constitution, in which the 
one or the few who have knowledge rule intelligently9. Second, Plato 
distinguishes the three right constitutions from the three wrong ones by 
means of the criterion of whether the rulers govern according to the law or 
against the law (Politikos, 302 d/e). On the contrary, Aristotle groups the 
six forms of constitutions according to the criterion of whether the rulers 
govern for the common good (τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον) or merely for their 
particular or personal advantage (Pol. III 7, 1279 a 17–1279 b 10).            
Aristotle distinguishes constitutions not only by means of the 
quantitative criterion of whether one, a few, or the many rule, and the 
normative-teleological criterion of whether the rulers aim at the common 
good or not. He differentiates constitutions also according to the specific 
quality of the ruler or the ruling group. Thus, Aristotle defines democracy 
                                                 
9  In the Politeia, Plato designates the best constitution, depending on whether one or more 
virtuous and knowledgeable persons rule, either as kingship or as aristocracy (Rep. IV, 
445 d). On the contrary, in the Politikos, he understands the correct constitution, in 
which one or more knowledgeable people rule intelligently, as a separate seventh 
constitution. Plato emphasizes that the correct constitution has to be dissociated from the 
other constitutions as far as a God from men (297 b/c, 302 c–303 b). He conceives of the 
other six constitutions merely as imitations of the correct constitution, the three good 
ones as imitations for the better, the three bad ones as imitations for the worse (293 e, 
297 c).    
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as the government of the poor, oligarchy as the rule of the rich, and 
aristocracy as the government of the most virtuous10. Combining all three 
aspects of his constitutional scheme, democracy can be defined as the rule 
of the many poor for their own advantage, oligarchy as the rule of the few 
rich for their benefit, and aristocracy as the government of the few 
virtuous for the common good (Pol. III 7/8, 1279 a 32–1279 b 19).  
Aristotle is aware that a classification which distinguishes constitutions 
according to both the quantity and the quality of the rulers could lead to 
taxonomy problems. This would be the case if a poor minority or a rich 
majority ruled. For him, in political reality such cases do not happen. 
While in every polis there are only a few rich or virtuous citizens, the 
people (δῆμος) or the majority consists always of the poor. In political 
reality, the quantitative and the qualitative criterion coincide (Pol. III 8, 
1279 b 20–1280 a 6; for Aristotle’s account of the exception Colophon 
see Pol. IV 4, 1290 b 14–17).   
In Books III–VI of the Politics, Aristotle extends and refines his 
scheme of six constitutions. He needs to do this, because the three criteria 
he initially offers for distinguishing constitutions are not precise enough. 
First, the normative-teleological criterion and its opposition between a 
government for the common good or for the personal advantage of the 
rulers is too simple. This plain opposition raises the question of how to 
define the common good and the advantage of the rulers, which amounts 
to the question about the goal or the end (τέλος) of a constitution. 
Concerning the three wrong constitutions, Aristotle mentions the 
safeguarding and increase of wealth (πλοῦτος) as the dominant aim of 
                                                 
10 Already Plato distinguishes constitutions according to a qualitative criterion. He 
comprehends aristocracy and oligarchy as the rule of the rich and democracy as the rule 
of the poor. For him, the difference between kingship and tyranny is that the first rule is 
based on voluntariness and the second one on violence (Politikos, 291 e–292 a; cf. 276 
d/e, 293 a). In the Politeia, Plato regards virtue (ἀρετή) as the central quality for 
aristocracy and kingship (Rep. IV, 445 d). 
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oligarchy and tyranny, and freedom (ἐλευθερία) as the highest goal of 
democracy (Pol. III 9, 1280 a 25–31; Pol. V 10, 1311 a 9–10; Pol. VI 2, 
1317 a 40–b 17; cf. EN VIII 12, 1160 b 12–15). How Aristotle 
understands the common good is disputed in the literature. Fred D. 
Miller, who discusses the different positions, distinguishes between 
individualistic and holistic interpretations of the common good, which 
both allow for an extreme and a moderate form11. In any case, in 
accordance with his ethical writings Aristotle equates the common good 
primarily with a good life (εὖ ζῆν) or with happiness (εὐδαιμονία), the 
natural end of the polis.      
Like the normative-teleological criterion, the quantitative and 
qualitative criteria are not precise enough and need to be supplemented. 
As a consequence, Aristotle introduces subspecies of the different 
constitutions. Already in Book III he presents five forms (γένη, εἴδη) of 
kingship12. From a conceptual and logical perspective this distinction is 
                                                 
11  Miller points out: “One line of interpretation is individualistic: to promote the common 
advantage is to promote the ends of its individual members. The polis is happy or 
flourishing provided that its individual citizens are happy. [...]. Another line of 
interpretation is holistic: the polis resembles an organism in that it has an end which is 
distinct from, and superior to, the ends of its individual members” (MILLER 1995, 194; 
italics by Miller). Miller maintains “that the preponderance of evidence in the Politics 
indicates that Aristotle has a moderate-individualist position” (ibidem, 204). 
12  According to his genetic approach, Eckart Schütrumpf maintains that in Book IV 
Aristotle rejects the scheme of six basic constitutions, which he presented in Book III, 
and displays a changed and progressed view on constitutions. For Schütrumpf, in Books 
IV–VI Aristotle takes a new theoretical approach. As a main reason for this 
interpretation Schütrumpf mentions that in these books Aristotle divides his six basic 
constitutions in subspecies (1980, 320–23, cf. 273; 1991, 46; 2001, 122–23). A central 
argument against this interpretation and in favor of the thesis that the Politics should be 
seen as a coherent unity is the fact that already in Book III Aristotle divides one 
constitution, kingship, into five subspecies. However, Schütrumpf tries to show that this 
division is not equivalent to Aristotle’s later divisions of democracy and oligarchy in 
subspecies (SCHÜTRUMPF 2011, 250–257). For my arguments that Aristotle’s 
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necessary, because the definition of a kingship as the government of one 
virtuous ruler for the common advantage lacks precision. It lacks precision 
because it does not indicate how much political power or competences a 
king has. Aristotle’s distinction of five kinds of kingship allows him to 
specify this for each form. The extremes are absolute kingship 
(παμβασιλεία), in which one man rules over everything, and the Spartan 
type of kingship, which is primarily a hereditary generalship. The 
remaining three forms are intermediates between these extreme forms, 
because in these constitutions the kings have less power and competences 
than in absolute kingship, but more than in Spartan kingship (Pol. III 
14/15, 1284 b 35–1286 a 2).       
Like the general definition of kingship, the common definitions of 
democracy and oligarchy as the rule of the many poor or the few rich for 
their own advantage have to be supplemented. Contrary to kingship, 
Aristotle distinguishes democracy and oligarchy not according to how 
much power one man has, but according to how many and which kinds of 
citizens participate in political power. In the first form of democracy all 
male citizens participate equally in government, in the second form only 
those who have some property and pay taxes, and in the third one only 
those with incontestable decent (Pol. IV 4, 1291 b 30–1292 a 7). 
Analogously, in the first form of oligarchy a greater number of citizens 
with a moderate amount of property participate in government, in the 
second one a lesser number with a greater amount of property, and in the 
third one an even lesser number with still greater property. In the fourth 
form of oligarchy only the very few citizens govern, who exceed everyone 
else by wealth and influence (Pol. IV 6, 1293 a 12–34). According to the 
logic of Aristotle’s distinction of constitutions, a fifth form of oligarchy 
would pass into a form of monarchy. This shows that Aristotle’s 
                                                                                                                            
subdivisions are essentially all equivalent extensions and refinements of his scheme of the 
six constitutions see KNOLL 2011 b, 417–421; cf. fn. 5.      
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subdivisions correspond to each other. That Aristotle’s subdivisions are 
equivalent can also be seen by the fact that the second form of democracy 
is close to the first form of oligarchy.             
 
2. Aristotle’s theory of distributive justice 
In Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, which contains the identical 
text as Book IV of the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle develops his 
comprehensive theory of justice (δικαιοσύνη)13. Justice is likewise a 
central topic of the Politics. This is especially true for distributive justice, 
which Aristotle starts discussing in Book III as justice (τὸ δίκαιον) in the 
distribution of political offices (ἀρχάς). This section substantiates the 
thesis that Aristotle’s account of distributive justice in the Politics is an 
extension and refinement of the doctrine of justice (δικαιοσύνη) in his 
ethical writings.14 However, the central thoughts of Aristotle’s theory of 
distributive justice are already found in Plato’s Laws15. 
                                                 
13  Almost all scholars acknowledge that the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) was written by 
Aristotle. Concerning the Eudemian Ethics (EE), some classicists like Hellmut Flashar 
still doubt that Aristotle is the author (1985, 76, 78). Most scholars today believe that 
the three common Books, NE V–VII and EE IV–VI, belong to the NE (BUDDENSIEK 
2012, 56 (fn. 1)). These are the reasons why this paper mainly refers to the NE.   
14  An opposite thesis has been recently defended by Eckart Schütrumpf. For him it is not 
appropriate to talk about “justice” or “distributive justice” in the Politics. Schütrumpf 
tries to substantiate this thesis with the fact that in Book III of the Politics Aristotle uses 
the term “τὸ δίκαιον”, which he translates with “Recht” (“right”), and not the term 
“δικαιοσύνη”. According to Schütrumpf, justice (δικαιοσύνη) only refers to the ethical 
problem of developing the character toward virtue (ἀρετή) (Schütrumpf 2011, 257–263; 
cf. my arguments against Schütrumpf’s thesis (KNOLL 2011b, 414–417), cf. fn. 17. For 
an instructive account of the role of justice in the Politics and of Aristotle’s distinction 
between objective and subjective justice see LISI 2017. In his paper Lisi criticizes 
rightfully that modern interpreters do not pay enough attention to Aristotle’s important 
distinction between justice as an objective norm and justice as a subjective state or 
disposition.        
15  For the reasons that substantiate this thesis see fn.19, fn. 21, fn. 26, fn. 44, and KNOLL 
2010.  
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In Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes justice 
(δικαιοσύνη) as the whole virtue or universal justice, which requires 
abiding by the laws of the polis, from justice as a part of virtue or 
particular justice. He divides particular justice (κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης) 
into distributive justice and rectifying justice: 
 
One form of particular justice, and of that which is just in the corresponding 
sense, concerns the distribution of honour or money or other things that are 
divisible among those who have a share in the constitution (for in these cases it is 
possible for one man to have a share either equal or unequal to that of another); the 
other form rectifies the conditions of a transaction (τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης 
καὶ τοῦ κατ᾽ αὐτὴν δικαίου ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ 
χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν τούτοις 
γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέρου), ἓν δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι 
διορθωτικόν, EN V 5, 1130b 30-34)16. 
 
Although Aristotle mentions money and “other things” as the subject 
of distributive justice, this form of justice primarily concerns the just 
distribution of political offices (ἀρχάς) and the honor (τιμή) that the 
citizens can achieve by exercising them. In the Politics, Aristotle even 
declares that “we speak of offices as honors” (Pol. III 10, 1281 a 31). 
That for Aristotle distributive justice relates primarily to the distribution of 
political power is already apparent in the Nicomachean Ethics. Shortly 
after his division of particular justice into distributive justice and rectifying 
justice, Aristotle outlines the two formal principles of distributive justice 
and refers to the political dispute concerning how to fill these principles 
with content and make them concrete:  
  
So the just necessarily involves at least four terms: two persons for whom it is 
in fact just, and two things in which it is manifested. And there is the same 
                                                 
16  All Greek quotes of the Nicomachean Ethics are taken from the edition of I. Bywater 
(ARISTOTELIS 1954). 
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equality between the things as between the persons, for the things are in the same 
ratio to one another as the persons: if the persons are not equal, they will not get 
equal things. And from there quarrels and complaints originate: when either 
equals have and are assigned unequal shares, or unequals equal shares. This is 
also clear from the fact that assignments should be according to worth. For 
everyone agrees that what is just in distribution must be according to worth in 
some sense. But they do not all mean the same sort of worth: for democrats it is 
freedom, for supporters of oligarchy it is wealth, for others it is noble birth, and 
for aristocrats it is virtue. So justice is a sort of proportion (ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον 
ἐν ἐλαχίστοις εἶναι τέτταρσιν: οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν, δύο ἐστί, καὶ ἐν 
οἷς, τὰ πράγματα, δύο. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς: ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα 
ἔχει, τὰ ἐν οἷς, οὕτω κἀκεῖνα ἔχει: εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, οὐκ ἴσα ἕξουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐντεῦθεν 
αἱ μάχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἢ μὴ ἴσα ἴσοι ἢ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχωσι καὶ νέμωνται. 
ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν τοῦτο δῆλον: τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς νομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι 
πάντες κατ᾽ ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες 
ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ᾽ ὀλιγαρχικοὶ πλοῦτον, οἳ δ᾽ 
εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ᾽ ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετήν. ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι, EN V 
6, 1131a 18-29)17. 
      
Distributive justice is a form of justice that is not blindfolded; it allots 
the goods of the polis with distinction of the persons and in view of their 
qualities. As different persons generally have different qualities, they 
usually get allotted unequal shares. In a just distribution, these shares 
should be bestowed on the persons in proportion to their different 
qualities, or as Aristotle puts it, in proportion to their unequal worth or 
merit (ἀξία)18. In a just distribution everyone gets allotted equal shares in 
proportion to his unequal worth or merit. Like Plato, Aristotle calls this 
                                                 
17  In this paragraph, in which Aristotle explains particular justice (κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης), 
he uses several times the terms “τὸ δίκαιον” and “δίκαιον”. The term “δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς 
νομαῖς” can be translated as “just in distribution” and as well as “justice in distribution”. 
This shows that Aristotle uses the terms “τὸ δίκαιον” and “δικαιοσύνης” as synonyms. 
In accordance with this, the term “τὸ δίκαιον” can be translated with “justice” and with 
“right” or “Recht” (cf. fn. 14).        
18  Only in a few English editions of the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics the term 
“ἀξία” is translated with “worth”. Usually it is rendered with “merit”.  
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form of equality, which he opposes to “numeric” or “arithmetic” equality, 
“proportional” or “geometrical” equality (EN V 6, 1131 a 29 ff.)19. For 
Aristotle, a distribution to citizens is just if the public goods are allotted 
according to proportional or geometrical equality.      
The above quoted paragraph from the Nicomachean Ethics contains 
two formal principles of distributive justice. The first principle establishes 
that a just distribution is one according to worth (κατ᾽ ἀξίαν). The second 
principle, which also refers to the relation between the persons who have 
claims, determines that only equals should get equal shares, while 
unequals should be allotted unequal shares. The first principle can be 
phrased “To everyone in proportion to his worth or rank”, the second one 
“Equal shares to equals, unequal shares to unequals”20.  
Aristotle observes that there is a consensus among citizens that justice 
in distribution “must be according to worth in some sense”21. But at the 
same time he reports a substantial disagreement about the criterion or 
standard, which is appropriate in order to measure worth (ἀξία). This 
disagreement exists among citizens in so far as they have different political 
                                                 
19  In the Laws, in which he already develops the main elements of Aristotle’s theory of 
distributive justice, Plato distinguishes between two concepts of equality. One kind of 
equality he calls “equality according to measure, weight and number”, and the other one 
the “most genuine” and “best” equality. This sort of equality, which for him is 
inextricably linked to political and distributive justice, allots more to the greater – more 
virtuous and educated – person, and less to the inferior one (VI, 757 a–e). In the Gorgias 
Plato calls this form of equality “geometrical equality” (508 a, cf. 490 b–e). Cf. fn. 26 
and fn. 44.         
20  The principle “To everyone in proportion to his worth or rank” is more appropriate for 
Aristotle’s political thought than the principle “To each his own”, which in German 
literature on Aristotle is usually regarded as the formula for distributive justice (ENGISCH 
1971, 159; HAACKE 1994, 28; SALOMON 1937, 26; TRUDE 1955, 108). The principles 
“To everyone in proportion to his worth” and “To everyone in proportion to his rank” are 
equivalent (cf. HAACKE 1994, 28; RICKERT 1997, 27). 
21  Cf. Pol. V I, 1301 b 35–36. In the Laws, Plato already declares that candidates for 
political offices should be elected or rejected “according to their worth” (VI, 751 d).   
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convictions. Aristotle mentions four groups with fundamentally different 
political convictions, which go along with four different standards of 
worth. The democrats favor “freedom (ἐλευθερία)” as the criterion of 
worth, the supporters of oligarchy “wealth (πλοῦτος)”, the aristocrats 
“virtue (ἀρετή)”, and an unnamed fourth group “noble birth (εὐγένεια)”. 
It is important to notice that for Aristotle the true aristocrats 
(ἀριστοκρατικοί) are those who hold “virtue” to be the appropriate 
standard of worth and not those who favor “noble birth”.While the criteria 
“wealth”, “virtue”, and “noble birth” allow a gradation of “more” and 
“less”, people are either free as citizens or - Aristotle’s contrast to 
freedom - they are slaves, foreigners or resident aliens22. 
For the political culture of his time Aristotle distinguishes between four 
different ways to fill the two formal principles of distributive justice with 
content and make them concrete. In accordance with this he discriminates 
four different conceptions of distributive justice: the democratic, the 
oligarchic and the aristocratic conception, and an undesignated fourth 
conception23. Each of the two principles thus can be phrased in four 
different ways: “To everyone in proportion to his wealth, freedom, virtue 
or noble birth”, and: “Equal shares only to persons equally wealthy, free, 
virtuous, or with equally good ancestors”.  
                                                 
22  Cf. KEYT 1991, 243–44. Keyt doesn’t explicitly mention resident aliens.   
23  Applying a distinction which John Rawls introduces in A Theory of Justice, David Keyt 
explains that “we can distinguish the concept of distributive justice from the various 
conceptions of it”. Keyt understands the different conceptions as interpretations of the 
one principle of distributive justice (KEYT 1991, 242–43, italics by D.K., cf. RAWLS 
1971, 5–6, and Keyt’s fn. 16 to the ultimately Aristotelian roots of Rawls’s distinction). 
Less appropriate, Fred D. Miller talks about a “dispute among different theories of 
justice: oligarchic justice, democratic justice, and aristocratic justice. At issue are rights 
within the political community” (MILLER 1995, 124; italics by M.K.). Miller’s 
expression “different theories of justice” is problematic, because it suggests that the 
different conceptions of distributive justice have little or nothing in common, which is not 
the case.      
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In the Politics, Aristotle refers two times to the short account of 
distributive justice that he gave in the Nicomachean Ethics (Pol. III 9, 
1280 a 16–25; Pol. III 12, 1282 b 18–23)24. Both references are located 
in Book III, which many scholars identify for good reasons as the centre of 
the whole Politics25. In Book III, Aristotle takes up the issue of the 
political dispute about the appropriate standard of worth and gives reasons 
for his own position. He concedes that in the political quarrel over how 
political offices should be distributed, freedom, wealth, noble birth, and 
virtue can be regarded with some right and for some reasons as justified 
claims. But none of the claims of the four political convictions in question 
are “absolutely justified” (Pol. III 13, 1283 a 29–31). Aristotle is not the 
first thinker who distinguishes and analyses competing reasons that 
support claims to political power. In the Laws, Plato already distinguishes 
seven, or rather eight, contradictory and competing claims (ἀξιώματα) 
used to justify ruling political communities and families26.    
In the political dispute about the just distribution of offices and the 
appropriate standard of worth all four political groups or parties can put 
forward some arguments. The supporters of an oligarchic conception of 
distributive justice, which Aristotle equates with the rich, argue that they 
pay more taxes, that they are “usually more reliable in matters of 
                                                 
24  These two references are usually, as Olof Gigon and Franz Susemihl state in their 
commentaries on the Politics, related to Book V 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics 
(ARISTOTELES 1965, 289; ARISTOTELES 1973, 306, 311).      
25  David Keyt calls Book III “the philosophical core of the entire treatise” (KEYT 1991, 
247). William L. Newman understands Book III as „the centre round which the whole 
treatise is grouped“ (NEWMAN 1887-1902, II, XXXI). The interpretation that Book III 
is the centre of the whole Politics can be substantiated as well by the cross-references (cf. 
KEYT/MILLER 1991, 4). 
26  For Plato’s distinction and list of seven reasons for claims see Laws III, 689 a–690 d. 
Though the claim of the rich citizens to share in the offices and honors in proportion to 
their wealth is not part of Plato’s list, he mentions it in Book V as an eighth claim (Laws 
V, 744 b–c).   
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contract” and that they “have a larger share of the land”, which is “to the 
benefit of the public” (Pol. III 9, 1280 a 25–31; Pol. III 13, 1283 a 31–
33). Because of these merits they hold an unequal share in political power 
to be just, and claim that an oligarchy, in which the offices are distributed 
in proportion to wealth, is the appropriate constitution. Aristotle criticizes 
this position, stating that one cannot derive conclusively from the single 
particular inequality of wealth a general inequality that could justify an 
oligarchic constitution. The argument of the supporters of oligarchy would 
be convincing if the end of the polis were wealth. But for Aristotle this is 
not the true goal of a political community (Pol. III 9, 1280 a 22–31; Pol. 
V 1, 1301 a 31–36).      
The adherents of a democratic conception of distributive justice argue 
that all male citizens are equal, because they are all born as free men. 
Because of that they hold it to be just if both the poor and the rich get an 
equal share in political power, and claim that a democracy is the 
appropriate constitution. Aristotle criticizes this position, stating that one 
cannot derive conclusively from the single particular equality of freedom a 
general equality that could justify a democratic constitution (Pol. III 9, 
1280 a 22–31; Pol. V 1, 1301 a 28–36). The argument of the democrats 
would be convincing if the true goal of the polis were freedom, but this an 
idea which Aristotle rejects. 
In the democracies of Aristotle’s time not only slaves and foreigners, 
but women and young men were excluded from political participation. 
The democratic method of distributing the majority of offices was a 
distribution for a short period by lot. The consequence was an equal 
chance for all male citizens to participate in political power, which led to a 
system “of all ruling over each, and of each over all in turn” (Pol. VI 2, 
1317 b 18–20). It is worth noticing that the account of the democratic 
conception of distributive justice, which Aristotle gives in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, differs in an important aspect from the one he gives 
in the Politics. In the Ethics he equates democratic justice with a 
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distribution according to worth (κατ᾽ ἀξίαν), which the democrats 
measure with the standard “freedom”. In the Politics he identifies 
democratic justice with equality according to number, which he opposes 
to equality according to worth (κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν) (Pol. 
VI 2, 1317 b 4, cf. 1318 a 3–10). While in the Nicomachean Ethics 
Aristotle seems to use “worth (ἀξία)” as a generic term or an open 
concept which can assume different meanings, in the Politics he uses it in 
a non-egalitarian sense pointing to the idea of an unequal rank, merit or 
desert of citizens.     
Contrary to supporters of both democratic and oligarchic conceptions of 
distributive justice, the members of the good families refer to their noble 
birth (εὐγένεια). They argue that they are citizens to a greater degree than 
those of low birth, that good birth is honored in every community, and 
that descendants of good parents are likely to be better than children of the 
low-born, because noble birth is the virtue of the family. With these 
arguments the better-born claim that it is justified that they get a bigger 
share in political power than the low-born (Pol. III 13, 1283 a 33–37).   
 
3. Distributive justice and constitutions: Aristotle’s arguments for the 
aristocratic conception of distributive justice and for aristocracy 
In a first step, this section substantiates the thesis that Aristotle 
understands the different forms of constitution, with the exception of 
tyranny, as embodiments of different conceptions of distributive justice. In 
a second step, the section argues for the thesis that in the political dispute 
among the supporters of four conceptions of distributive justice Aristotle 
has a clear preference for the aristocratic conception27. Taken together, 
                                                 
27  An opposite thesis is central for Dolf Sternberger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s 
fundamental political convictions. Sternberger claims that Aristotle differs 
“considerably” from Plato, because Aristotle values democratic equality and justice 
“equally” as oligarchic and aristocratic equality and justice (STERNBERGER 1984, 130–
31, 139, 154; cf. fn. 19 and fn. 44).    
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these two theses yield a third one: Because Aristotle has a preference for 
the aristocratic conception, he must likewise have a preference for 
aristocracy.  
The above given reconstruction of the arguments of the well-born, the 
democrats, and the supporters of oligarchy shows that each conception of 
distributive justice is linked with its corresponding constitution. To 
advocate the distribution of political offices in proportion to wealth is the 
same as to support oligarchy. To claim that every free-born male citizen 
should get an equal share in political power is identical with the 
endorsement of democracy. And likewise, “the distribution of honors 
according to virtue (κατ᾽ ἀρετήν) seems to be the most characteristic trait 
of aristocracy; for virtue is the defining criterion of aristocracy, as wealth 
is the criterion for oligarchy, and free birth of democracy” (Pol. IV 8, 
1294 a 9–11). The political dispute over the just distribution of the offices 
and the appropriate standard of worth amounts to a quarrel over the 
appropriate constitution of the polis. 
In Athens, the dispute of political parties over the right constitution of 
the polis broke out long before Aristotle’s birth28. This dispute turned into 
a violent fight during the Peloponnesian War, which was led from 431 
until 404 BC between Athens and Sparta and their respective allies. 
During this horrific war, civil wars broke out in several cities, in which 
Athens endorsed the democratic and Sparta the anti-democratic forces. 
Like the defection of one polis from their ally, a civil war often led to a 
change in constitution. While Athens introduced democracy, Sparta 
                                                 
28  In The Constitution of Athens, Aristotle (or some other author) reports about Athens in 
the early 6th century BC: “The parties at this time were three in number. First there was 
the party of the Shore, led by Megacles the son of Alcmeon, which was considered to 
aim at a moderate form of government; then there were the men of the Plain, who desired 
an oligarchy and were led by Lycurgus; and thirdly there were the men of the Highlands, 
at the head of whom was Pisistratus, who was looked on as an extreme democrat” 
(ARISTOTLE, 1991, § 13, 11–12).  
The Meaning of Distributive Justice for Aristotle’s Theory of Constitutions 
 
Π Η Γ Η / F O N S   I  (2016), 57-97 75 
 
 
substituted democracy with a constitution that they called an “oligarchy”, 
in which only a part of the people held political power29. 
In Book V of the Politics, Aristotle examines the change (μεταβολή) of 
constitutions and in particular why they decay and how they can be 
preserved. In the important first chapter he declares that democracy and 
oligarchy are the prevailing constitutions of his time. In view of these two 
constitutions he explains the general causes and motives for sedition and 
revolution (στάσις). His account is based on his theory of distributive 
justice. He even holds that democracy and oligarchy originate from the 
opposing conceptions of distributive justice of their supporters (Pol. V I, 
1301 a 25–32). From these opposing conceptions the citizens of 
competing political parties also derive their irreconcilable judgments of 
whether an equal or unequal distribution of political power is just or 
unjust. Therefore, the opposing conceptions are, in the end, the reason 
why democracies and oligarchies are often not stable and cannot be 
preserved. The rich citizens strive to overthrow democracies, because 
they hold an equal distribution of political power to be unjust. Sedition in 
oligarchies originates because the poor citizens think their exclusion from 
political life is unjust and because they demand an equal participation in 
government (Pol. V I, 1301 a 32–1302 a 13)30. For Aristotle, the general 
cause or motive for sedition and revolution is that citizens are outraged 
and get angry when they perceive power relations to be unjust, and 
therefore want to change them31. This cause or motive concerns the inner 
                                                 
29  THUKYDIDES 2002, III, 82, 206; BLEICKEN 1994, 58–59; cf. GEHRKE 1985, 356, and 
BLEICKEN 1994, 59). After the Peloponnesian War, some more bloody overthrows 
happened in Greece, for example in Thebes and in Thessalia (GEHRKE 1985, 352).    
30  In Book V, Aristotle declares several times that the cause for political overthrow in 
democracies and oligarchies is that the people or the rich think that the distribution of 
political rights is unjust (1302 a 22–32, 1303 b 3–7, 1316 a 39–1316 b 3).    
31  Ronald Polansky points out: “Since the disposition fostering change or sedition is 
ultimately the sense of injustice in distribution in the community, this must be the most 
general of all the causes operative in change” (Polansky 1991, 335). In line with 
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state of the revolutionaries that is brought into being by their sense of 
justice. In the end, the human sense of justice which enables man to have 
perceptions of good and bad, of just and unjust, is the “anthropological” 
basis of all different conceptions of distributive justice32.           
As several scholars have pointed out, Aristotle understands the 
different forms of constitution, except tyranny, as embodiments of 
different conceptions of distributive justice33. In the Eudemian Ethics, 
Aristotle declares that “all constitutions are a particular form of justice; for 
they are communities, and every community is held together by justice (αἱ 
δὲ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι δικαίου τι εἶδος: κοινωνία γάρ, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πᾶν διὰ 
τοῦ δικαίου συνέστηκεν)” (EE VII 9, 1241 b 13–15). In the Politics, he 
explains an important aspect of how justice holds the political community 
together. A constitution is not only the order which determines to whom 
                                                                                                                            
Polansky, Hans-Joachim Gehrke pronounces: “In der Tat ist der entscheidende 
Gesichtspunkt das Empfinden der ungerechten Behandlung durch das Vorherrschen 
differenter Gleichheitsvorstellungen. Man fühlt sich zurückgesetzt und benachteiligt, in 
seinem Recht und Anspruch verletzt. Es unterliegt keinem Zweifel, daß Aristoteles hier 
ein ganz wesentliches Movens der ‘Aufsässigkeit’ erarbeitet hat” (GEHRKE 2001, 143).  
32  In a famous paragraph Aristotle explains: “Contrary to the other living beings, it is 
peculiar to man that he alone has perception (αἴσθησιν ἔχειν) of the good and bad, of the 
just and unjust, and of other similar qualities. Community in these things makes a 
household and a polis” (Pol. I 2, 1253 a 15–18). In view of this paragraph, John Rawls 
states: “Aristotle remarks that it is a peculiarity of men that they possess a sense of the 
just and the unjust and that their sharing a common understanding of justice makes a 
polis” (RAWLS 1971, § 39, 234). For Rawls, together with the human capability of 
having a conception of ones good, the capability for a sense of justice is the “basis of 
equality” of “human beings as moral persons” (ibidem, § 4, 19; cf. § 77, 505).    
33  Richard Mulgan explains: “Different constitutions embody different conceptions of 
justice with differing criteria of how honours and other public goods should be 
distributed” (MULGAN 1991, 310). In line with this Fred D. Miller pronounces “that the 
constitution is in some manner identical with justice (in the sense of being the 
embodiment of justice)” (MILLER 1991, 299, cf. MILLER 1995, 79). Analogously, 
David Keyt points outs that “a constitution is primarily a kind of distributive justice” 
(KEYT 1991, 238). 
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the political power is allotted in the polis, but ethically justifies this 
distribution through a conception of distributive justice inextricably linked 
to it. Furthermore, a constitution establishes what the final or dominant 
goal of the political community is. The question of the goal of the polis is 
an ethical question, because it mainly revolves around the decision of 
what a political community and its rulers hold to be a good life and what 
values it holds to be important. In Book IV of the Politics, Aristotle gives 
a second and extended version of his definition of a constitution which 
includes these two ethical aspects: 
 
A constitution is the order of a polis in respect to its various offices and the 
questions of how they are distributed, what the supreme power of the polis is, and 
what the end of every community is (πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ 
περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηνται, καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τί τὸ 
τέλος ἑκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστίν, Pol. IV 1, 1289a 15-18). 
 
Aristotle discusses both the ethical questions of the just distribution of 
the political offices and of the goal of the polis in the chapters in Book III, 
which follow his first definition of a constitution. This strongly suggests 
the interpretation that he phrases a second definition in order to include 
the results he gained in Book III. This is an argument for the unity of the 
Politics. First, it shows that there is no rupture between Books III and IV, 
as the supporters of the genetic-analytic interpretation of the Politics 
suggest34. Second, it indicates that the subjects and arguments of the 
Politics are not only coherent and consistent, but build on each other in 
such a way that later parts implicitly or explicitly refer back to earlier 
                                                 
34  For Werner Jaeger, the Politics is divided in an early “Urpolitik” (Books II, III, VII, and 
VIII), which contains Aristotle’s “speculative outline”, and the “empirical books” IV–
VI, that were supposedly written later (JAEGER 1955, 275–282). According to Eckart 
Schütrumpf, Book III is an early precursor to the discussions in Book IV, and a treatise 
that has not been completely preserved or that has never been finished (SCHÜTRUMPF 
1980, 273).  
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parts, which they presuppose, continue, distinguish, or supplement35. 
Both points can be further substantiated by section one of this paper, 
which demonstrated that Aristotle’s account of constitutions in Books IV–
VI is essentially an extension and refinement of his scheme of six 
constitutions in Book III. The introduction of subspecies of the different 
constitutions already begins in Book III, which distinguishes five forms of 
kingship36.   
A constitution establishes what the goal or end of a political community 
is. As has already been pointed out, in Book III Aristotle assesses three 
constitutions as wrong because they are forms of government structured 
for the advantage of the rulers and not for the common good. In oligarchy 
and tyranny, the end of the rulers and thus the polis is to safeguard and 
increase wealth, in democracy the highest goal is the realization of 
freedom. According to Aristotle, democratic freedom means that 
everyone can live how he wants. Aristotle makes clear that neither 
freedom nor wealth can be regarded as the true ends of a polis (Pol. III 9, 
1280 a 22–31; Pol. V 9, 1310 a 28–36, cf. Pol. VI 2, 1317 b 10–13). 
After he rejected freedom and wealth as candidates for the true goal of 
the polis, Aristotle mentions several ends and shows that these cannot be 
regarded as the specific or highest goals of the political community. He 
brings up bare life or survival, mutual defense against injury, trade and 
mutual intercourse or advantage, and mutual protection against injustice 
and damages as possible ends of a polis (Pol. III 9, 1280 a 31–1280 b 5). 
Against such conceptions of the goal of the political community Aristotle 
argues that trade agreements, treaties for mutual defense, and other forms 
of alliance also exist between peoples and thus cannot be regarded as the 
characteristic or specific end of a polis. The goals to mutually protect each 
other, to not harm each other, or to do trade are only 
                                                 
35  For a compilation of examples of how the subjects and arguments of the Politics build on 
each other see KNOLL 2011 b, 413–14; cf. fn. 47. 
36  Cf. fn. 12. 
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pre-conditions that must be present before a polis can exist; but the presence of 
all these conditions is not enough to make a polis. What constitutes a polis is an 
association of households and clans in the good life (εὖ ζῆν), in order to achieve a 
perfect and self-sufficient existence. […] The goal (τέλος) of the polis is the good 
life, and these things are means to that end. And a polis is an association of clans 
and villages in a perfect and self-sufficient existence, which in our view constitutes 
a happy and noble life (τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς). Therefore, the political 
communities must be considered to exist for the sake of good actions (πράξεων), 
and not for the sake of bare social life. Hence, those who contribute most to such 
an association have a greater share in the polis then those who are their equals or 
superiors in freedom or decent but not their equals in political virtue (πολιτικὴν 
ἀρετὴν), or than those who surpass them in wealth but are surpassed by them in 
virtue (Pol. III 9, 1280b 31-35; 1280b 39-1281 a 8).         
 
The supreme goal of the polis is the good and happy life. Aristotle 
states this conviction in the first paragraphs of the Nicomachean Ethics, in 
which he points out that happiness (εὐδαιμονία) is the highest end and 
supreme good which man can achieve through his actions37. Aristotle’s 
definition of the supreme goal of the polis is a premise of the argument 
that he gives in order to substantiate his own preference in the political 
dispute about how political offices and honors should be distributed38. The 
paragraph cited above gives a short version of this argument and mentions 
once more the four competing reasons for political claims that were 
common in the political culture of Aristotle’s time: freedom, wealth, noble 
birth and virtue.  
Aristotle’s argument for his political preference is part of his general 
theory of what constitutes a just distribution. Usually in a distribution of 
goods there are different people who have claims and who advance 
                                                 
37  In the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that happiness (εὐδαιμονία) 
as the supreme of all practical goods is related to political science (EN I 2, 1094 b 7–10). 
38  For an interpretation of Aristotle’s argument that is partly different and partly similar than 
the one given above see KEYT 1991, 250–259. 
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different and competing reasons in order to justify their claims. According 
to Aristotle’s theory, the disputed question of which reason for political 
claims is most justified in a distribution can be decided in regard to the 
goal of this distribution. A reason for a justified claim must not only have 
a factual connection to the goal of the distribution but must also contribute 
substantially to reaching it. 
A first illustration of this general theory can be seen in Aristotle’s 
critique of the oligarchic and the democratic conceptions of distributive 
justice (Pol. III 9, 1280 a 22–31). The supporters of oligarchy claim a 
greater share in the polis, in offices and honor, in proportion to their 
greater wealth, which is their claim’s justification. If the goal of the polis 
were property or wealth, the supporters of oligarchy would have a strong 
argument. As an instructive analogy to the polis and the competing claims 
of the rich and the poor Aristotle brings up an imaginary financial 
partnership of two men with a capital of 100 talents in which one man 
contributed only one talent and the other one 99 talents. It is obvious that 
in such a partnership the man who only put in one talent would only have 
a share in the whole capital and in the interest it generates in proportion to 
his contribution and thus a much smaller share than the man who put in 99 
talents. As the only goal of a financial partnership is an increase in wealth, 
such extremely unequal shares are justified. But for Aristotle, the polis is 
neither a financial partnership nor is its goal an increase in wealth or 
property. 
This paragraph of the Politics is not well-elaborated, but it suggests that 
Aristotle has a similar critique of the democratic conception of distributive 
justice in mind, whose supporters he criticizes alike for not being able to 
see that the justified claims they can make are very limited. If the goal of 
the polis were the realization of freedom, all free men, the rich and the 
poor alike, could make an equal contribution to reach this goal and thus 
have an equal share in the political community. But the polis is not a 
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partnership for the goal to realize ones freedom (Pol. III 9, 1280 a 25–
31).               
A second illustration of Aristotle’s general theory is his example of a 
just distribution of flutes39. If flutes are distributed in a just way, the 
person who is distinguished through the capability of outstanding flute-
paying should get the best flute40. To be sure, alternative reasons for 
claims like noble birth, beauty, or wealth have a higher rank in the general 
order of goods than the capability of flute-paying. But they have no factual 
connection to the goal of good flute-paying and they do not contribute 
anything to reach it. This is why they are arbitrary and irrelevant standards 
in a just distribution of flutes. With his example of a just distribution of 
flutes Aristotle makes clear that offices and honors should not be allotted 
according to superiority in any good whatsoever. There are goods like 
height or the ability to run fast which are irrelevant in a just distribution of 
offices and honors, because they have no factual connection to the goal of 
the polis and do not contribute anything to the attainment of it. 
Furthermore, a distribution according to superiority in any good 
whatsoever would presuppose that every good is comparable with any 
other, which is impossible in regard to the heterogeneity and 
incommensurability of the mentioned goods (Pol. III 12, 1282 b 23–1283 
a 11). 
Aristotle concedes that the standards of freedom and wealth have some 
claim in the political distribution of offices and honors. A polis that 
                                                 
39  Some chapters before Aristotle introduces his example of the distribution of flutes, he 
declares that “the ruled correspond to the flute-maker, the ruler to the flute-player who 
uses the instrument” (Pol. III 4, 1277 b 29–30). Like flute-makers allot flutes to flute-
players, the ruled distribute political power to the rulers.   
40  For Martha Nussbaum’s interpretation of Aristotle’s example of a just distribution of 
flutes see NUSSBAUM 1990, 171. According to Nussbaum’s interpretation of his theory 
of distributive justice, Aristotle holds a capability for a certain function to be the “morally 
relevant criterion” for the distribution of “the necessary material conditions” to perform 
this function (ibidem).      
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consisted only of slaves would not be able to exist. The same is true for a 
polis made up of only poor people. Such a polis would have no income in 
taxes and, as such, no financial means for public affairs. This 
demonstrates that both the poor and the rich citizens together with their 
qualities make an indispensable contribution to the existence of the polis. 
Therefore, they can claim some share in political participation. However, 
in a just distribution of offices and honors, Aristotle holds political virtue 
to be the standard of worth that is most justified41. 
The first step of Aristotle’s argumentation for the aristocratic 
conception of distributive justice is to substantiate the thesis that the 
specific goal of the polis is the good and happy life, as opposed to 
survival, wealth, freedom, or something else. While people agree that 
flutes should be distributed for the end of good flute playing, there is no 
consensus among them about the true end of the polis. As a second step 
he establishes his general theory of distributive justice, according to which 
a justified claim in a distribution must not only have a factual connection 
to the goal of this distribution but must also contribute substantially to 
reaching it. The third and final step is to show that political virtue 
contributes much more to a good and happy life than do freedom, wealth, 
or noble birth. The conclusion of these steps is that the aristocratic 
conception of distributive justice can claim by far better reasons than the 
other three conceptions, which shows that Aristotle has a clear preference 
for it. 
Considering the competing standards noble birth, freedom, wealth, 
justice (δικαιοσύνη) and political virtue (πολιτικὴ ἀρετή)42, Aristotle 
phrases this conclusion as follows:  
                                                 
41  The paragraph above shows that Ada Neschke-Hentschke’s interpretation that “only” 
political virtue can advance a claim for rule is too exclusive and too rigid (NESCHKE-
HENTSCHKE 2012, 115). 
42  For the problem whether Aristotle wrote in 1283 a 20 in fact “πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς”, which 
is most likely, or “πολεμικῆς ἀρετῆς”, see KNOLL 2009, fn. 266. In Aristotle’s list of 
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In view of the existence of the polis, it would seem that all, or at least some, of 
these controversial claims are justified; but in regard to the good life education and 
virtue would have a more justified claim, as we have already said43 (πρὸς μὲν οὖν 
τὸ πόλιν εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνιά γε τούτων ὀρθῶς ἀμφισβητεῖν, πρὸς 
μέντοι ζωὴν ἀγαθὴν ἡ παιδεία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ μάλιστα δικαίως ἂν ἀμφισβητοίησαν, 
καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον, Pol. III 13, 1283a 23-26). 
 
Like Plato, Aristotle holds “education (παιδεία)” and “virtue (ἀρετή)” 
to be the appropriate standard of worth in a just distribution of offices and 
honors44. In his statement, “education” and “virtue” should not be 
apprehended as rivaling claims. Rather, education should be understood 
as the formation of the soul (ψυχή) that leads to the ethical virtues, the 
virtues of the character45. The most important ethical virtue is justice as a 
trait of character or disposition (ἕξις). Starting at an early age, education 
has to form the activities and thereby the habits in order to produce a 
virtuous character. For Aristotle, education should not only focus on 
subjective justice but also on other ethical virtues like courage (ἀνδρεία) 
and temperance (σωφροσύνη) (EN II 1, 1103 a 31–1103 b 25). Together 
with the intellectual virtue named prudence (φρόνησις), these ethical 
virtues constitute what Aristotle calls political virtue (πολιτικὴ ἀρετή). 
Already in Chapter 4 of Book III he mentions prudence (φρόνησις) as the 
virtue peculiar to a good ruler (Pol. III 4, 1277 a 14–15; cf. Elm 1996). 
                                                                                                                            
claims “justice (δικαιοσύνη)” and “political virtue (πολιτικὴ ἀρετή)” should not be 
understood as rivaling claims, as for Aristotle justice is a part of political virtue. Cf. Pol. 
III 9, 1281 a 7–8.   
43  This statement refers back to the short version of Aristotle’s argument in Pol. III 9, 1280 
b 39–1281 a 8.  
44  In the Laws, Plato mentions explicitly both “education (παιδεία)” and “virtue (ἀρετή)” 
as the relevant standard for the “most genuine” and “best” form of political justice and 
equality (VI, 757 c); cf. KNOLL 2010, and fn. 19. 
45  Cf. PATT 2002, 78. 
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For Aristotle, political virtue is the most justified reason for claims in a 
distribution of offices and honors46.         
For Aristotle, political virtue contributes substantially to reaching the 
goal of the polis, the good and happy life. In order to answer the question 
of how Aristotle conceives of this contribution, it is necessary to ask how 
he conceives of a good and happy life. According to the central definition 
of Aristotle’s theory, happiness (εὐδαιμονία), “is an activity of the soul 
according to virtue (κατ᾽ ἀρετήν)” (EN I 6, 1098 a 16–17). Human beings 
can live a good and happy life if they develop and practice their ethical and 
intellectual virtues in two forms of life. As citizens, they can practice the 
combination of prudence (φρόνησις) and ethical virtues in a political life. 
As scientists or philosophers, they can practice their intellectual virtues – 
wisdom (σοφία) as a combination of science (ἐπιστήμη) and intuition 
(νοῦς) – in a life of contemplation (EN I 3, 1095 b 14–1096 a 5; EN I 13, 
1103 a 1–7; EN VI 3, 1139 b 16–17; EN VI 7, 1141 a 19).        
It is not difficult to see how political virtue contributes substantially to 
reaching the good life, the goal of the polis. To practice political virtue as 
a citizen is identical with good actions and a political life. In an active 
political life a citizen carries out virtuous actions for his polis in the 
assembly, the council, the law-courts, or in war. For Aristotle, an active 
political life, in which citizens deliberate, govern, and shape the polis, 
counts as a good and happy life. Such a life aims at honor, and, as an even 
higher end, at virtue (EN I 3, 1095 b 22–31). Furthermore, it depends on 
the political virtue of the citizens whether a polis flourishes or perishes, 
whether it can keep its self-sufficient existence or not, and whether its 
constitution remains stable or faces civil war and sedition. If politically 
virtuous citizens maintain the stability of the political order and ensure that 
                                                 
46  See for a similar interpretation of Aristotle’s evaluation of the role of political virtue 
GORDON 2007, 145, 154, and SCHÜTRUMPF 1980, 146. According to Ada Neschke-
Hentschke, for Aristotle political virtue is composed out of prudence (“der praktischen 
Klugheit”) and just ethos (“dem gerechten Ethos”) (NESCHKE-HENTSCHKE 2012, 115).  
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the polis is self-sufficient and flourishing, they safeguard the freedom and 
wealth of all citizens, and thus, some important means for a good and 
happy life. Like peace and leisure, stability and prosperity are the best 
conditions for a fruitful life of contemplation, the good life of the scientist 
or philosopher. If a virtuous political life is able to reach these aims it 
contributes substantially to realizing this form of life, which, according to 
Aristotle’s arguments in the Nicomachean Ethics, is even happier than the 
political life (EN X 7–9, 1177 a 12–1179 a 32).   
According to Aristotle’s classification of the political convictions of his 
time, for democrats worth (ἀξία) “is freedom, for supporters of oligarchy 
it is wealth, for others it is noble birth, and for aristocrats it is virtue” (EN 
V 6, 1131 a 27–29). This section has demonstrated that for Aristotle the 
appropriate standard of worth and the most justified reason for claims in 
the distribution of political offices and honors is political virtue. Therefore, 
according to his classification he has to be categorized as a supporter of the 
aristocratic conception of distributive justice47. Furthermore, this section 
                                                 
47  Also Fred D. Miller comes to the conclusion that “Aristotle makes clear the superiority 
of the aristocratic theory”: “In so far as the citizens are free, well-born, or wealthy, they 
can help to keep the polis in existence; but only in so far as they possess virtue can they 
directly contribute to its natural end. Therefore, the aristocratic theory is correct, and the 
virtuous have a just claim to political authority which is superior to that of other members 
of the polis. Furthermore, the aristocratic constitution is best [...] Thus the aristocratic 
theory of political rights is the authoritative theory of rights” (MILLER 1995, 127; cf. fn. 
23). David Keyt distinguishes between an aristocratic and an Aristotelian conception of 
distributive justice. The latter has a standard of worth that includes not only virtue but 
wealth and freedom (KEYT 1991, 247, 259). To be sure, the Aristotelian standard of 
worth embraces wealth and freedom. But this is true for the aristocratic standard as well. 
As a consequence, there is no need to introduce an additional Aristotelian standard or 
conception of distributive justice. Keyt’s interpretation leads to an inconsistency within 
the analysis of his paper. Keyt claims correctly that Aristotle’s best polis is a “true 
aristocracy”, which “embodies the Aristotelian conception of distributive justice” 
(ibidem, 260). As each constitution embodies its corresponding conception, it is only 
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has made evident that for Aristotle every constitution contains or 
embodies a corresponding conception of distributive justice. As a 
consequence, Aristotle has to be classified in regard to his political 
convictions as a supporter of aristocracy.        
Like for Plato, for Aristotle aristocracy is a constitution closely 
connected with kingship (Pol. V 10, 1310 b 2–3, b 31–32; Rep. IV, 445 
d). The fundamental principle of both constitutions is the virtue of the 
rulers. In both constitutions political power is distributed in proportion to 
virtue, which serves as both the aristocratic and the monarchic standard of 
worth. Apparently, both constitutions embody the same conception of 
distributive justice. But as kingship means an extremely unequal share in 
political power, it is only justified if the king distinguishes himself through 
outstanding virtue. For Aristotle, such extraordinary individuals cannot be 
found in contemporary Greece (Pol. VII 14, 1332 b 16–27). 
In Chapter 13 of Book III, Aristotle emphasizes that in the distribution 
of political power education and virtue are the most justified reasons for 
the political claim. As a consequence, in Chapters 14 through 17 he 
discusses mainly kingship and aristocracy and ponders which of these 
constitutions is best. After advancing some arguments in favor of 
aristocracy, Aristotle concludes that aristocracy is generally more 
desirable for the political communities than kingship (Pol. III 15, 1286 b 
3–7). In the second chapter of Book IV, Aristotle refers back to these 
reflections: “Aristocracy and kingship have already been discussed (to 
consider the best constitution (ἀρίστης πολιτείας) is the same thing as to 
consider the two constitutions so named; since both are based on virtue 
provided with the necessary external means)” (Pol. IV 2, 1289 a 30–33). 
In this reference Aristotle understands both aristocracy and kingship as 
subspecies of the best constitution, which elucidates the close connection 
between these two constitutions. 
                                                                                                                            
sound to understand the conception contained in aristocracy as an aristocratic conception 
of distributive justice.      
The Meaning of Distributive Justice for Aristotle’s Theory of Constitutions 
 
Π Η Γ Η / F O N S   I  (2016), 57-97 87 
 
 
 
4. Aristocracy as the constitution of the best polis 
The arguments of this paper show that Aristotle supports both an 
aristocratic conception of distributive justice and aristocracy. This final 
section substantiates the thesis that the constitution of the best polis, 
which Aristotle outlines in Books VII and VIII, must be understood as a 
“true aristocracy”, which embodies an aristocratic conception of 
distributive justice. Furthermore, the section gives arguments against 
interpretations that claim that Aristotle’s “ideal constitution” is a mixed 
government, which he calls polity (πολιτεία). The conclusion of this 
section and the whole paper is that Aristotle has to be understood as an 
aristocratic political thinker. 
Aristotle approaches the question of the constitution of the best polis by 
first answering the question of the most desirable life. The specific 
characteristic of the best city, the polis according to our wishes (κατ᾽ 
εὐχήν), is that the citizens can lead the best and happiest life in it (Pol. 
VII 4, 1325 b 36). In order to achieve this goal, the citizens have to 
develop the specifically human virtues and become perfectly good and 
virtuous, which requires excellent natural dispositions, a first-rate 
education, and social conditions like wealth, leisure, and exemption from 
having to work. Apparently, the demands for being a member of the 
citizens of the best polis are very exacting. As a consequence, the best 
polis does not have many citizens.  
The social structure of Aristotle’s best polis has the shape of a pyramid. 
The top of the pyramid is constituted by a small leisure class of the good 
and virtuous citizens. The lower parts are composed of the vast majority of 
people who live in the polis as non-citizens. These people will be 
foreigners, resident aliens, and, as much as possible, slaves and 
barbarians. The non-citizens constitute the laboring class, which Aristotle 
divides into day-laborers, seamen, farmers, traders, and craftsmen. For 
Aristotle, the members of the laboring class are not parts of the polis, they 
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are only indispensable conditions and means for the polis (Pol. VII 9, 
1329 a 34–39). 
Aristotle justifies the exclusion of the laboring class in view of the end 
of the polis. In order to live a good and happy life, one needs virtue. But 
the laboring class lacks the natural dispositions, education, or social 
conditions required to develop their virtues (Pol. VII 9, 1329 a 21–24). 
The laboring class has to serve the leisure class as a means for their good 
and happy life. Aristotle justifies this with the theory of natural slavery, 
which he develops in Book I48. He also argues that the members of the 
working class have a lower worth and are by nature designed for the 
function (ἔργον) and end (τέλος) to serve as means for the human beings 
that have a higher rank in the natural order (cf. Knoll 2009, 200–01). 
According to Aristotle’s second definition, “A constitution is the order 
of a polis in respect to its various offices and the questions of how they are 
distributed, what the supreme power of the polis is, and what the end of 
every community is” (Pol. IV 1, 1289 a 15–18). The end of the best polis 
is undoubtedly the good and happy life, which requires that the citizens 
develop and practice their ethical and intellectual virtues in a political or 
theoretical life. This is an important reason why the constitution of the 
best polis cannot be understood as a polity. Aristotle declares more than 
once that the citizens of the polity, average Greek men, are far from being 
fully virtuous (Pol. III 7, 1279 a 39–1279 b 4; Pol. IV 11, 1295 a 25–
31). As a consequence, they do not possess the qualities which are 
required for citizenship in the best polis (cf. Schütrumpf 1980, 159). The 
best polis aims at a good and happy life and thus virtue. The best means to 
                                                 
48  In Book VII Aristotle refers several times directly or indirectly to his theory of natural 
slavery in Book I (Pol. VII 2, 1324 b 36–41; Pol. VII 2, 1325 a 28–31; Pol. VII 14, 
1333 a 3–11; Pol. VII 14, 1334 a 2; for a view of the barbarians that is more refined than 
the one exposed in Book I see Pol. VII 7). These references are an argument for the unity 
of the Politics. For a substantiation of the thesis that Aristotle justifies the rule of free 
citizens over natural slaves with his theory of distributive justice see KNOLL 2009, 149–
156.  
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reach these goals is education. This explains why in his account of the best 
polis in Books VII and VIII Aristotle devotes a great deal of attention to 
education.  
Aristotle does not say much about the concrete political institutions of 
the best polis. In order to determine its form of constitution, it is necessary 
to analyze his thoughts on how the political offices and the political power 
should be distributed. The citizens of the best polis are all supposed to be 
good, virtuous, and just. They are all equal and of the same kind. This is 
why they must all have the right to participate in the government of the 
polis. Aristotle points out that “for many reasons it is necessary for all to 
share in ruling and being ruled in turn. For equality means the same 
treatment of same persons, and a constitution that is not based on justice 
can hardly survive” (Pol. VII 14, 1332 b 25–29). According to the 
conception of distributive justice that is embodied in the constitution of the 
best city, all citizens have to participate in the government because they 
are all equally good and virtuous. Equal participation is not only required 
for reasons of justice but for reasons concerning the preservation of the 
polis. Linking up with his analysis of the change of constitutions in Book 
V, Aristotle argues that an unjust constitution is often an instable one 
because it leads to sedition.  
Aristotle’s statement that “it is necessary for all to share in ruling and 
being ruled in turn” could be misunderstood as suggesting that the best 
constitution is a polity or a democracy49. But an analysis of how Aristotle 
understands equal participation rules out this interpretation. Shortly after 
this statement, he explains that it cannot be disputed that the rulers have to 
                                                 
49  This is a central misunderstanding of Nussbaum’s interpretation of Aristotle’s account of 
political participation. Nussbaum claims that Aristotle’s “ideal city is a politeia” (2001, 
147), and that he understands participation as a democratic form of participation 
(NUSSBAUM 1990; cf. 2000, 109). Mistakenly, she tries to support this thesis with 
Aristotle’s statement quoted above (Pol. VII 14, 1332 b 25–27; cf. Knoll 2009, 260–
63).     
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be better than their subjects. Referring back to what he had said some 
paragraphs before, Aristotle explains that nature made a distinction within 
the persons of the same kind by making some younger and some older. 
For the younger citizens it is appropriate to be governed, for the older 
ones to govern. This shouldn’t offend the younger citizens as their turn to 
rule will come with the years (Pol. VII 14, 1332 b 35–42).            
Aristotle correlates the two age-groups with two different qualities and 
two different political tasks. The first political task is to deliberate, to 
judge in law-courts, and to govern the polis. The second one is to protect 
the government against those who do not want to obey, and to defend the 
polis against attackers from outside. About the qualities of the two age-
groups Aristotle declares that by nature the younger citizens have strength 
or vigor (δύναμις), and the older ones prudence (φρόνησις). For Aristotle, 
the second political task is appropriate for the younger citizens, and the 
first one for the older ones. The constitution of the best polis entrusts both 
tasks to the same persons, however, not at the same stage of their life. 
Nevertheless, by allotting both tasks to every citizen it ensures an equal 
participation in the political life of the city. Aristotle justifies this 
distribution of political tasks with the aristocratic conception of justice:  
 
But as by nature strength is found in the younger men and prudence in the 
older, such a distribution seems expedient and just; this mode of division also 
possesses conformity with worth (ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ πέφυκεν ἡ μὲν δύναμις ἐν 
νεωτέροις, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἐν πρεσβυτέροις εἶναὶ, ἔοικεν οὕτως ἀμφοῖν νενεμῆσθαι 
συμφέρειν καὶ δίκαιόν ἐστιν. ἔχει γὰρ αὕτη ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν, Pol. VII 9, 
1329a 14-17).  
 
In the best polis, the political offices and the supreme power are 
distributed according to worth. In its constitution, the appropriate standard 
of worth is primarily prudence (φρόνησις), which is the intellectual virtue 
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that, combined with ethical virtues, constitutes political virtue50. This 
demonstrates that the constitution of the best polis embodies an 
aristocratic conception of distributive justice (cf. Keyt 1991, 260). 
Because, for Aristotle, each constitution embodies its corresponding 
conception of distributive justice, the constitution of the best polis has to 
be understood as an aristocracy. The quote above shows that the 
constitution of the best polis cannot be conceived of as a polity. Aristotle 
defines the polity as a mixture of democracy and oligarchy (Pol. IV 8/9, 
1294 a 15–b 17). Analogously, the conception of distributive justice of 
the polity is a mixture of the standards of freedom and worth. The quote 
above demonstrates that these standards have little relevance in a just 
distribution of political offices.  
Aristotle outlines the constitution of the best polis as an aristocracy. 
However, he considers the case that one citizen is distinguished through 
such extraordinary virtue that he surpasses all the others by far (Pol. VII 
14, 1332 b 16–27). According to Aristotle’s theory of justice, such an 
outstanding man would deserve to be allotted the supreme power and to 
be king. But as such men rarely exist, Aristotle’s consideration is rather 
hypothetical than practical. However, as virtue is both the aristocratic and 
the monarchic standard of worth, and as aristocracy and kingship are 
closely connected constitutions, Aristotle holds them to be subspecies of 
the best constitution (Pol. IV 2, 1289 a 30–33).       
The argument that the constitution of the best polis embodies an 
aristocratic conception of distributive justice is not the only reason that 
supports the thesis that it must be understood as an aristocracy. The 
constitution of the best polis also corresponds exactly to the features which 
Aristotle mentions in order to characterize a “true aristocracy”. In Book 
IV Aristotle refers back to his account of aristocracy in Book III and talks 
                                                 
50  The citizens of the best polis do have the ethical virtues as well. For Aristotle, they are 
“absolutely just” (Pol. VII 9, 1328 b 38).    
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about “true aristocracy” as the “first and best constitution” (Pol. IV 7, 
1293 b 1–3, 19; cf. Pol. IV 2, 1289 a 30–33). He defines “true 
aristocracy” as a “constitution which is based on men that are absolutely 
the best according to their virtue, and not on good men only in relation to 
some other standard” (Pol. IV 7, 1293 b 3–5). Only in a “true 
aristocracy” the “good man is absolutely the same as the good citizen; in 
all other constitutions the good citizen is only good relatively to his own 
form of constitution” (Pol. IV 7, 1293 b 5–7). In all other constitutions 
apart from “true aristocracy” the citizens are not distinguished through 
perfect virtue or the virtue of the perfect man. The virtue of a citizen has to 
be oriented towards his particular constitution. As there are many forms of 
constitutions, “it is evident that there is not one single virtue which is 
perfect virtue. But when we speak of a good man we mean that he 
possesses one single virtue which is perfect virtue” (Pol. III 4, 1276 b 31–
34). The citizens of the best polis are all perfectly good and virtuous, and 
the constitution is based on these men. As soon as the citizens come of 
such an age that they may achieve prudence (φρόνησις), “the virtue of the 
citizen and ruler is the same as that of the best man”. Aristotle points out 
that “the virtue of the good man and that of the good citizen is the same in 
the best polis”. As the constitution of the best polis is based on the best 
and most virtuous men it corresponds exactly to the features which 
characterize a “true aristocracy” (Pol. VII 14, 1333 a 11–12; Pol. III 18, 
1288 a 38–39; Pol. VII 9, 1328 b 38–39). 
The thesis that the constitution of the best polis is a “true aristocracy” 
can be supported as well by a third argument which is connected to the 
second. The goal or end of the constitution of the best polis is a good and 
happy life. This presupposes a focus on education in order to develop the 
virtues which are necessary for a good and happy life. A “true 
aristocracy” has exactly the same goal and the same requirement to 
develop virtue. In the context of his distinction of three kinds of 
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aristocracy51 in Book IV, Aristotle makes clear that aristocracies care 
about virtue and pay public attention to its generation (Pol. IV 7, 1293 b 
12–13; cf. Pol. IV 2, 1289 a 30–33). The constitution of the best polis is 
a “true aristocracy” which embodies an aristocratic conception of 
distributive justice and which is based on the best men, whose outstanding 
virtues allow them to live a good and happy life.  
As has been mentioned before, there are two opposing lines of 
interpretation of Aristotle’s fundamental political convictions. An analysis 
of the mistaken interpretations, which hold Aristotle’s “ideal city” to be a 
polity, shows that their representatives neglect Aristotle’s distinction of 
four different tasks of constitutional theory, which he articulates at the 
beginning of Book IV of the Politics. The most important of these 
distinctions is the one between the task “to study which is the best 
constitution”, and the task to “ascertain the form of constitution most 
suited to all cities” (Pol. IV 1, 1288 b 21–24, 33–35; cf. Knoll 2012, 
133–135). While Aristotle executes the study of the best constitution in 
Books VII and VIII, he examines the polity mainly in Books IV–VI. The 
polity is most suited to all states because most cities at Aristotle’s time 
were either democracies or oligarchies, and the polity is a stable mix of 
elements of these two unstable constitutions (Pol. IV 8/9, 1294 a 15–b 
17)52. The neglect of Aristotle’s distinction of these two tasks is already 
one cause for Werner Jaeger’s division between an early “Urpolitik” 
(Books II, III, VII, and VIII), which contains Aristotle’s “speculative 
outline”, and the “empirical books” IV–VI, that were supposedly written 
later (Jaeger 1955, 275–282). If one takes seriously Aristotle’s 
declaration that the same science has four different tasks, many 
                                                 
51  For Aristotle’s distinction of three kinds of aristocracy and for the problem whether there 
are not, in fact, four kinds see IRRERA 2016.  
52  Democracy and oligarchy are the main topic of Book VI. A large part of Book V is 
devoted to the analysis of the reasons why constitutions and especially why democracies 
and oligarchies change through seditions and revolutions.     
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misunderstandings and supposed contradictions of the Politics disappear 
together with the need to postulate different strata of their origin. The 
same conclusion can be drawn from this analysis of the role of Aristotle’s 
theory of distributive justice for his theory of constitutions. Distributive 
justice is a central topic of the Politics which is equally relevant for 
different books and for different aspects of Aristotle’s theory of 
constitutions, and which must be regarded as one of the main factors that 
demonstre the unity of the Politics.     
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